π¨βπΌβ Which of the following sources of knowledge is a posteriori?
A posteriori means knowledge that requires experience or empirical evidence (I remember it as knowledge that can only be known *post* or after experience). A priori knowledge, in contrast, can be gained without experience or empirical evidence. For example, you can know "triangles have 3 sides" a priori because you don't need to count the sides of a bunch of triangles in the real world to confirm it - you can verify it mentally because that's just what the word 'triangle' means. In contrast, "water boils at 100Β°C at sea level" or "grass is green" can only be known a posteriori because you would have to have some empirical observation or experience to confirm it.
ποΈβ Which theory of perception says that the immediate objects of perception are mind-dependent sense-data that are caused by and represent mind-independent objects?
Indirect realism says objects (e.g. tables, ladders, and chairs) exist even if nobody is perceiving them, that they are mind-independent - this is the realism part. But indirect realism says what we perceive is not the actual objects themselves, but mind-dependent sense data that represents them - this is the indirect part.
π€β Which definition of knowledge says you don't know anything unless it is 100% certain and impossible to doubt?
This is Descartes' approach to knowledge at the beginning of Meditations on First Philosophy, for example. He decides to treat every belief that can be doubted - however seemingly ridiculous the reason for doubt - as false and only treats beliefs he can be 100% certain of as true.
πβ Which of the following best characterises rationalism's intuition and deduction thesis?
Both rationalism and empiricism (generally) agree that *analytic* truths can be known via intuition and deduction alone. But, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy says, "The debate between rationalists and empiricists is [that] the former assert, and the latter deny, the Intuition/Deduction thesis with regard to propositions that contain substantive information about the external world [i.e. synthetic truths]."
ποΈβ Knowing your home city well is an example of which kind of knowledge?
Acquaintance knowledge is knowledge of - for example, knowledge of a person (e.g. "I know my best friend well") or a place. It can be contrasted with ability knowledge (knowledge how) such as knowing how to juggle or ride a bike, and propositional knowledge of facts (knowledge that) such as knowing that "2+2=4" or knowing that "Paris is the capital of France".
π³β The 'master argument' is an argument for which theory of perception?
George Berkeley's 'master argument' says that the idea of mind-independent objects is incoherent. Berkeley's reasoning (through the character Philonous) is that as soon as you try to imagine or conceive of a mind-independent object, it becomes mind-dependent (because you are picturing it in your mind). So, Berkeley argues, the very idea of a mind-independent object is incoherent and impossible. As such, Berkeley rejects the existence of mind-independent objects entirely (i.e. he rejects realism) and instead argues that everything is mind-dependent (i.e. idealism).
π€β Which philosopher argued that knowledge of necessary truths (like noncontradiction) cannot be gained from experience and so must be innate?
In New Essays On Human Understanding, Leibniz writes: "The mind is capable not merely of knowing [necessary truths], but also of finding them within itself. If all it had was the mere capacity to receive those items of knowledgeβ¦ it would not be the source of necessary truthsβ¦ For it cannot be denied that the senses are inadequate to show their necessity". In other words, Leibniz says experience only tells us how things are (whatβs contingently true) not how they must be (whatβs necessarily true). And yet we know that necessary truths like noncontradiction must always be true. So, Leibniz argues, knowledge of necessary truths canβt come from experience β it must be innate.
π¨βπΌβ Gettier problems aim to show that...
Gettier describes two scenarios where someone has a justified true belief, but the belief is true only by coincidence. These scenarios show that justified true belief alone is not enough for knowledge - that you can have a justified true belief and yet not have knowledge - and so 'justified true belief' is not a sufficient definition of knowledge.
πΆβ What does rationalism's innate knowledge thesis claim?
Rationalism's innate knowledge thesis says we are born already knowing some things (e.g. necessary truths like noncontradiction). Some rationalists (e.g. Plato) go further and argue for option 1 (that all knowledge is innate), but this isn't necessary for the innate knowledge thesis.
πβ Which of the following is an analytic truth?
An analytic truth is a statement where the predicate is contained within the subject, making it true by definition. For example, 'bachelor' contains the term 'unmarried.' Analytic truths lead to contradictions when denied - e.g. a 'married bachelor' is self-contradictory, like '4-sided triangle'. In contrast, a synthetic truth like 'London is the capital of England' is true, but it's not true by definition. Something like 'Leeds is the capital of England' is a false statement, but it does not lead to a contradiction.
π§βπΌβ What is the false lemma in Gettier case #1 (the job interview)?
In Gettier case #1, Smith forms the justified true belief that "the man who gets the job has 10 coins in his pocket" because (1) he hears the boss say he's going to give Jones the job, and (2) he sees Jones has 10 coins in his pocket. But (1) turns out to be false - it's a false lemma - because Smith gets the job instead. But this false lemma led to the true belief "the man who gets the job has 10 coins in his pocket" because Smith gets the job and Smith (luckily) also had 10 coins in his pocket.
π±β Which philosopher justified belief in the existence of mind-independent objects as the 'best hypothesis'?
Russell is an indirect realist. Indirect realism says that objects (e.g. tables, chairs, etc.) exist mind-independently, but that we perceive these objects indirectly via mind-dependent sense data. But this raises a problem: If we only ever perceive sense data, and not objects themselves, then how can we justify belief in these mind-independent objects causing the sense data? Russell's response is an example of an abductive argument: mind-independent objects are the best hypothesis to explain these perceptions. One reason mind-independent objects are the better hypothesis is that they connect perceptions: For example, imagine you see a cat on the floor, leave the room, and then when you come back you see it is on the sofa. The explanation that the cat really exists as a mind-independent object explains this: While you were away, the cat still exists and walked from the floor to the sofa. However, if the cat doesn't exist as a mind-independent object, then we have to say there's just sense data of a cat on the floor, then sense data of a cat on the sofa, with no explanation connecting these two perceptions.
πβ Which of the following best describes a contingent truth?
E.g. "Paris is the capital of France" is a contingent truth because it's possible (e.g. in some other universe) that whoever decided Paris should be the capital decided to make Lyon the capital instead. In contrast, something like "2+2=4" is necessarily true - there's no possible universe where this statement is false.
π€¨β Which of the following is an example of global scepticism?
Global scepticism (AKA universal scepticism or radical scepticism) is the view that knowledge is impossible across the board - that we can't know anything at all. The other options are examples of local scepticism, because they restrict doubt to a particular area. For example, belief that it's impossible to gain knowledge of moral truth (option 3) is moral scepticism, not global scepticism. The moral sceptic could say we can't know anything about moral truth but maintain that we can know things in other areas (e.g. that "2+2=4"). Only option 1 denies knowledge in every domain, which makes it an example of global scepticism.
π³β Which of the following is *not* a problem for direct realism?
The veil of perception is a problem for *indirect* realism because indirect realism says we perceive objects indirectly via sense data. As such, we may doubt whether this sense data corresponds to the objects we perceive. This isn't a problem for direct realism, however, as *direct* realism says we perceive the real (i.e. mind-independent) world directly. In other words, there is no 'barrier' or 'veil' between perception and reality with direct realism, so the veil of perception problem never emerges.
πβ Which of the following is an issue for the infallibilist definition of knowledge?
Infallibilist approaches to knowledge include conditions such as 'certainty' or 'the impossibility of doubt'. These strict conditions ensure that anything meeting the definition does count as knowledge, but they are arguably too demanding, because some beliefs we ordinarily count as knowledge would be excluded. For example, there are conceivable reasons to doubt the belief that 'Paris is the capital of France' (e.g. you could be deceived by an evil demon), but this belief is still generally regarded as knowledge.
πΆβ Which philosopher characterises the mind at birth as a tabula rasa, or blank slate?
John Locke characterises the mind at birth as a tabula rasa, or blank slate (more precisely, he describes it as a white sheet of paper that experience writes on). According to Locke, all knowledge comes from two types of experience: (1) sensation and (2) reflection. This contrasts with Leibniz, who argued that the mind already contains knowledge of some necessary truths, such as noncontradiction, from birth.
πβ What is the false lemma in Gettier case #2?
In Gettier case #2, Smith forms the justified true belief that "either (1) Jones owns a Ford or (2) Brown is in Barcelona". He forms this belief because (1) he sees Jones driving a Ford, and (2) he can use the logically valid principle of addition to add "or Brown is in Barcelona". Smith thinks his belief is true because of (1), but this is a false lemma: Jones actually rents his Ford and so (1) is false. However, by sheer luck, Brown is in Barcelona, so the entire statement "either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona" turns out to be true. Like all Gettier cases, this is supposed to show that justified true belief is not sufficient for knowledge because Smith's belief here was true and justified but not knowledge (because it was just lucky - Smith thought his belief was true because (1) but it turned out to be true because (2)).
πβ According to idealism, what are the immediate objects of perception?
George Berkeley's idealism is the theory of perception which says that mind-independent objects do not exist and that what we perceive are mind-dependent ideas (and these ideas are what reality is). Berkeley says: "to be is to be perceived". In other words, for things to exist, they have to be being perceived by someone. And so, if nobody is perceiving an object, then that object doesn't exist.
π°β What is Descartes' 2nd wave of doubt?
Descartes' 3 waves of doubt in Meditations on First Philosophy come in order from least to most severe: (1) Illusion, (2) Dreaming, (3) Deception by evil demon. Because we often don't realise we're dreaming, says Descartes, it's possible you could be dreaming right now and so your beliefs about what you're seeing, hearing, etc. could be false. This cast doubt on much of what we know. But even in a dream, Descartes says, certain truths - like mathematical facts (e.g. 2+3=5) - remain certain. So, unlike the third wave of doubt (the evil demon), this second wave of doubt does not undermine all knowledge.