πβ Which of the following ethical theories is consequentialist?
Utilitarian theories are consequentialist because they judge whether an action or rule is right or wrong based on its outcomes or consequences. For example, hedonistic forms of utilitarianism say an action or rule is good if it maximises the consequence of happiness/pleasure. So, for hedonistic utilitarianism, an act of stealing would be morally good if the thief's pleasure outweighs the victim's pain. In contrast, deontological ethics focuses on duties or rules (e.g. stealing is always wrong, regardless of consequences), and virtue ethics focuses on the moral character of the agent (e.g. would a good person steal?).
π« β According to Kant, a maxim leads to a contradiction in conception if...
The categorical imperative, for Kant, is that we should only act only according to rules/maxims that everybody could follow. A rule/maxim leads to a contradiction in conception when the practice it depends on would collapse if everyone followed it. For example, if everyone followed the rule/maxim "to steal" all the time, then private property would no longer exist (because people can always just steal it), and so if everyone is following this rule "to steal" then it's not even possible to steal because no one owns anything - the rule/maxim contradicts itself. So, stealing is wrong according to Kant because it leads to a contradiction in conception and can't be made into a rule/maxim that everybody could follow.
π§β Which of the following best describes 'eudaimonia'?
Eudaimonia is Aristotle's word for a good life - flourishing. It's not just a morally good life (although that's part of it) but also a happy life, with successful and meaningful work, loving family and friends, and so on. Eudaimonia is the final end for humans - it's not something we value for some further goal.
π β The tyranny of the majority is commonly made as an argument against which normative ethical theory?
Utilitarianism (i.e. basic hedonistic act utilitarianism) says what is morally good is the action that maximises happiness. But there may be actions that are morally bad that maximise happiness if enough people get pleasure from that thing. For example, if 1000 sickos got 1 unit of pleasure from seeing an innocent person be tortured, and that innocent person suffered 175 units of pain from being tortured, then utilitarianism would say torturing the innocent person is good (because 1000 > 175). But it just seems wrong to torture an innocent person, regardless of consequences, so this challenges utilitarianism.
β β Which of the following metaethical theories is an example of moral realism?
Moral realism is the view that mind-independent moral properties and facts exist. In other words, moral realism says 'good' and 'bad' are real objective properties of the world, and there are facts involving these properties (for example, "stealing is wrong" can be a fact, just as "grass is green" can be a fact). Moral non-naturalism is a realist theory because it says moral properties exist, but that these moral properties are basic, irreducible, non-natural properties.
πβ Which of the following best illustrates a hypothetical imperative according to Kantβs moral philosophy?
Hypothetical imperatives are conditional - they tell you what to do if you have a certain goal. Here, for example, you don't have to exercise regularly if you don't care about being healthy. But Kant argues that moral rules such as "don't steal" are categorical rather than hypothetical - they apply to all people at all times, regardless of circumstances or desires.
ββ How would error theory analyse the moral judgement "stealing is wrong"?
Error theory is (a) Cognitivist - it believes moral judgements/statements are intended as descriptions of the world that can be true or false. But error theory is also (b) Anti-realist - it doesn't believe that (mind-independent) moral properties exist. So, according to error theory, when someone says "stealing is wrong", they are describing the world, but the description is *false* because the property 'wrongness' does not exist.
Eudaimonia translates to something like: flourishing, thriving, happiness, a good life. Aristotle says this is a final end - something we value for itself. He says: "we choose [eudaimonia] for itself, and never for any other reason. It is different with honour, pleasure, intelligence, and good qualities generally. We do choose them partly for themselves⦠but we choose them also for the sake of [eudaimonia]." So, where something like money is good as a means to something else (e.g. buying things), eudaimonia is good for its own sake - it's a final end.
π·β Which of the following best describes 'phronesis' from Aristotle's virtue ethics?
In Aristotleβs virtue ethics, phronesis (practical wisdom) is the intellectual virtue that enables a person to think about how to act virtuously and to successfully act virtuously in particular situations. It goes along with moral virtues (e.g. courage or kindness) by guiding actions according to the particular circumstances of the situation. Rather than following rigid rules, phronesis involves applying virtues appropriately to concrete situations, which is why it is 'practical' wisdom rather than abstract theoretical knowledge.
π§β Which of the following is an example of *non-hedonistic* utilitarianism?
Preference utilitarianism is non-hedonistic because it evaluates actions based on how well they satisfy individualsβ preferences, rather than the amount of pleasure or pain produced. In contrast, Benthamβs act utilitarianism and Millβs qualitative utilitarianism are hedonistic because they define good in terms of pleasure and pain (hedonism). Rule utilitarianism can also be hedonistic if it evaluates rules by the pleasure/pain they produce.
π β Mackie's argument from queerness supports which metaethical view?
Moral realism says moral properties like 'good' and 'bad' are real, objective, mind-independent properties of the world, similar to other properties like being square or 10 metres tall. But Mackie rejects moral realism because, he says, for objective 'bad' or 'wrongness' to exist then there would have to be an objective property of, for example, the act of stealing that says βdonβt do this!β - and that's a weird or metaphysically queer idea.
πβ Which of the following is *not* a variable in Bentham's utility calculus?
Bentham's utility calculus - sometimes called the felicific or hedonic calculus - is a way to quantify the pleasures and pains resulting from a course of action and thus, according to Bentham's hedonistic act utilitarianism, quantify the moral worth of that action. The calculus includes 7 variables: Intensity, duration, certainty, propinquity, fecundity, purity, and extent.
πβ Which of the following best describes the good will, according to Kant?
The good will, according to Kant, means to act for the sake of duty. This basically means to choose to do what's right *because it's what's right* and not for some other reason. For Kant, the good will is the source of moral worth. So, according to Kant, there's an important difference between e.g. (1) charging a fair price because it's good for business vs. (2) charging a fair price because it is the right thing to do. Although both do what is right, (2) has good will but (1) does not. Another example would be (1) a child who buys a present for his mother because he loves her vs. (2) a child who buys a present for his mother because he has a duty to. Again, Kant would say (2) is good and has moral worth, whereas (1) does not. This illustrates the difference between acting in accordance with duty vs. acting for the sake of duty (i.e. the good will).
π₯·β Which philosopher would say stealing is wrong because it leads to a contradiction in conception when universalised?
A maxim (i.e. rule for action) leads to a contradiction in conception if it becomes self-contradictory for everyone to follow it. Kant would say stealing leads to a contradiction in conception when universalised because if it was always OK to steal (i.e. stealing was a universal law) then nobody would 'own' anything because anyone could take your stuff because stealing is a universal law. So, in a world where everyone can steal, stealing becomes impossible, and so stealing leads to a contradiction in conception. As such, Kant says stealing is always wrong.
πΌοΈβ Which of the following forms of utilitarianism takes a *qualitative* approach?
*Quantitative* utilitarian approaches quantify the consequences of an action to determine whether it is right or wrong. For example, basic act utilitarianism just adds up all the pleasures of an action and subtracts the pains - it's a quantitative calculation, like a mathematical sum. But Mill introduces a *qualitative* distinction to utilitarianism: Some pleasures are of a quality that is inherently more valuable. For example, the intellectual pleasure of reading some high-minded philosophy book is better than the lower pleasure of scoffing pies (Mill would say).
ββ What do moral anti-realists believe?
Moral anti-realists believe (1) that mind-independent moral properties (e.g. 'good' and 'bad') do not exist, and further (2) that mind-independent moral facts (e.g. 'stealing is bad') do not exist either. In other words, moral anti-realism is the view that there is no such thing as objective morality. Examples of moral anti-realist theories include error theory and emotivism.
ββ What do moral non-cognitivists believe?
Moral non-cognitivism is the view that moral judgements (such as "stealing is wrong") express non-cognitive mental states and so are neither true or false. Emotivism is an example of non-cognitivism because it says "stealing is wrong" just means "booo! stealing!", and "booo! stealing!" is neither true or false. Similarly, prescriptivism is an example of non-cognitivism because it says "stealing is wrong" just means "don't steal!", and "don't steal!" is neither true or false.
π‘β Which of the following claims about emotivism are accurate?
Emotivism is perhaps the most obvious non-cognitivist theory. It says moral judgements - e.g. "stealing is wrong" - are not truth-apt descriptions or beliefs but are instead expressions of emotion. So although "stealing is wrong" has the grammatical structure of a true/false description, emotivists say it really means something like "Booo! Stealing!", and so is neither true or false. Emotivism (and all non-cognitivist theories) rejects objective moral properties (i.e. emotivism is an anti-realist theory) because it denies that moral statements are descriptions. And if moral statements aren't descriptions, then you don't need objective moral properties to make those descriptions true or false.
πβ Which of the following is a virtue that falls within Aristotle's golden mean?
Temperance means self-control. According to Aristotle, it's the mid-point or mean between the vice of licentiousness (i.e. self-indulgence) and the vice of insensibility (i.e. self-denial). For example, it is licentious (vice of excess) to eat whatever you want all the time. But if you can't enjoy a tasty treat meal from time to time then you are insensible (vice of deficiency). Temperance (the virtue) is in between these two extremes.
π§β Which of the following is the *humanity formula* of Kant's categorical imperative?
The categorical imperative is Kant's general principle of the moral law. But Kant gives various 'formulations' of the categorical imperative, one of which is the humanity formula. The humanity formula says we must always treat humans (including ourselves) as ends rather than simply as means. This rules out, for example, stealing because in stealing e.g. a loaf of bread from someone else, you are using the other person as a means to get bread without acknowledging that person's own ends, goals, or desires (they might want to keep their bread).
πͺβ Which of the following works best as a translation of 'ergon' from Aristotle's virtue ethics?
'Ergon' is also often translated as 'function'. For example, the ergon of a knife is to cut things, a clock's ergon is to keep time, a car's ergon is to get you to your destination, and so on. For Aristotle, a thing is 'good' to the extent it fulfils its function, and 'bad' if it doesn't. For example, a good knife cuts well and a good car gets you to your destination safely and reliably. This function argument extends to humans. Aristotle argues that the ergon or function of human beings is to use and act according to reason. So, similarly, a good human is one that uses reason and acts well according to reason. A bad human, in contrast, does not act well and does not act according to reason.
πβ According to prescriptivism, βstealing is wrongβ means...
Prescriptivism says moral judgements (e.g. "stealing is wrong") express instructions that aim to guide behaviour, rather than descriptions or beliefs. So, for example, what people mean when they say "stealing is wrong" is something like "don't steal!". It's a non-cognitivist theory because "don't steal!" is not the kind of statement that can be true or false - it's simply an instruction, like "shut the door" or "go over there". This is in contrast to cognitivist theories, which treat "stealing is wrong" as a literal description or belief about the world that is capable of being true (or false).