⚛️❓ Which of the following theories of mind would reject physicalism?
Physicalism says everything - including the mind - is either physical or supervenes on the physical. In other words, physicalism says there is no possible way you could have two things that are *physically* identical but different in some way. However, property dualism denies physicalism because it says some properties of the mind - e.g. qualia and consciousness - are not physical and don't supervene on the physical. For example, property dualism says it's possible that - in another world - you could have a person who is physically identical to you but without qualia or consciousness (i.e. a philosophical zombie). And if something could be physically identical but lack qualia, then qualia 'comes apart' from the physical and so physicalism is false and property dualism is true.
💭❓ Which of the following is an example of qualia?
The technical definition of qualia according to the A-level philosophy specification is "intrinsic and non-intentional phenomenal properties that are introspectively accessible". What this means is that qualia are properties of our subjective experiences or perceptions of things instead of objective properties of the things themselves. So when you look at a ripe tomato, for example, you experience red qualia. The qualia is the redness of your experience or perception of the tomato, which is different from the physical wavelengths of light or whatever that make the tomato itself red. That inner sensation - the experience of ‘redness’ is a quale.
🧠❓ Which philosophical theory of mind says mental states (e.g. pain) ontologically reduce to brain states (e.g. c-fibers firing)?
Type identity theory says mental states ontologically (but not analytically) reduce to brain states in a similar way to how 'lightning' reduces to 'electrical discharge'. In other words, what a particular type of mental state like pain is - physically, in our actual world - is a particular type of brain state. But the word 'pain' does not mean the same thing as 'c-fibers firing' (even though they are, physically, the same thing) because they are two different concepts.
💭❓ Which of the following best illustrates the 'intentionality' of certain mental states?
Intentionality is the ability of certain mental states (e.g. thoughts and beliefs) to be 'about' or directed towards a subject. For example, a belief that aliens exist is *about* aliens, a thought about frogs is *about* frogs. The other options, in contrast, aren't about anything - they're just experiences or properties of experience.
💪❓ 'Super Spartans' are primarily used as an argument against which theory of mind?
Behaviourism says mental states (e.g. pain) analytically reduce to behaviours or behavioural dispositions (such as saying “ouch!”, having elevated heart rate, etc.) and that internal feelings are irrelevant. Super Spartans are hypothetical beings who feel pain internally but mask all behaviours and dispositions associated with pain. Since Super Spartans are conceivable, behaviourism is challenged: it seems possible to have the mental state of pain without any observable behaviour.
✂️❓ Descartes' indivisibility argument supports which philosophical theory of mind?
Substance dualism is the view that the mind and the body (the mental and the physical) are distinct substances. Descartes' indivisibility argument supports this view by arguing that the mind and body have different properties: (1) The body/physical stuff is a divisible substance (e.g. you can cut an arm or a leg off), (2) But the mind/mental stuff is an indivisible substance (e.g. you can't cut someone's mind in half), so (3) The mental and physical must be distinct substances, says Descartes.
👩🔬❓ Which thought experiment argues for property dualism by describing a neuroscientist called Mary who learns all the physical facts about colour from within a black-and-white room?
Mary learns all the physical facts about colour while confined to a black-and-white room. But when she leaves and actually sees red for the first time, it seems she would learn something new: what it’s like to experience red. This suggests that qualia (i.e. properties of subjective experiences) are non-physical and cannot be fully explained by physical facts alone.
👻❓ Which claim best describes epiphenomenal dualism?
Dualism (in general) says the mental and physical are separate things. But within dualism, there's the question of how these two things interact. Interactionist dualism says mental events can influence physical events and physical events can influence mental events (i.e. both directions). But epiphenomenal dualism says mental events (e.g. qualia, thoughts) are caused by the brain but have no causal power themselves - a bit like how smoke from a steam train is a by-product of the engine.
✨❓ Which of the following arguments supports property dualism?
A philosophical zombie is a being (in another possible universe, say) that is physically identical to a human being but doesn't have qualia. Such zombies are conceivable - we can imagine them. So, zombies are (metaphysically) possible, says Chalmers. And so, qualia are not physical or supervenient on the physical because it's possible qualia could be absent in a physically identical world. So, property dualism is true.
🇨🇳❓ What does Ned Block's China brain thought experiment aim to show?
Functionalism says minds and mental states can be characterised entirely in terms of functional roles. However, the China brain is a scenario where the population of China perfectly imitates the function of the brain using two-way radios (right down to the level of individual neurons). The intuition is that although the China brain is functionally identical to the mind/brain, it isn't mentally identical - it wouldn't actually feel pain, for example. So, functionalism must be false - there is more to mental states than their function.
🤯❓ Which philosophical theory of mind says (folk-psychological) mental states, such as 'pain' and 'belief', do not exist?
Eliminative materialists reject 'folk psychology' (i.e. our common-sense theory of the mind - concepts like 'pain' or 'belief'). Eliminativists argue that a proper analysis of mental states (or what we call mental states) will look more like neuroscience, with specific descriptions of the mechanics of the brain. Once this neuroscientific analysis is complete, eliminativists say traditional mental concepts can be discarded, because they do not correspond to real neural processes – that there is no such thing as 'pain' or 'belief', just neurons firing and so on.
👸❓ Princess Elizabeth's conceptual interaction problem is an issue for which philosophical theory of mind?
Descartes' substance dualism says the mind is a completely separate substance from the physical world. But Descartes' student, Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia, questioned how these two substances interact. She argued that physical things (e.g. a ball) only move when pushed by other physical things (e.g. a foot kicking it). And so if the mind is a non-physical thing, then it wouldn't be able to move the physical body. But the mind clearly does move the body, which suggests substance dualism is false.
🤕❓ Which of the following would behaviourism say is irrelevant to the meaning of ‘pain’?
Philosophical behaviourism says that statements about mental states can be analysed, without loss of meaning, in terms of behaviours and behavioural dispositions. This means it rejects the idea that words for mental states (like 'pain' or 'happy') refer to private, introspectively accessible inner objects (such as qualia). Instead, behaviourism says the meaning of words like 'pain' is entirely grounded in publicly accessible behavioural criteria.
🧟❓ What is a philosophical zombie?
David Chalmers uses the conceivability of philosophical zombies to argue for property dualism - the view that qualia is neither physical nor supervenes on the physical. This is because if it is conceivable that you could have something physically identical but without qualia, then physical stuff is not essential to what qualia is - it's metaphysically possible to have one without the other.
💭❓ Which theory of mind says the mind could exist independently of the physical body and brain?
Substance dualism (AKA Cartesian dualism, after Descartes) says reality consists of two distinct kinds of substance: (1) mind and (2) body. In other words, it says the mental and physical are completely separate kinds of thing that could exist independently of each other - that you could have a mind without a body and vice versa. In contrast, type identity theory and eliminative materialism are physicalist theories and so say reality consists entirely of physical stuff and so the mind is, ultimately, a physical thing as well. Property dualism rejects physicalism but doesn't go as far as substance dualism and say the mind is a completely different substance. Instead, property dualism just says certain properties of the mind (e.g. qualia, consciousness) are non-physical.
