πββοΈβ Which argument aims to prove God's existence a priori solely from the definition or concept of God?
The ontological argument attempts to prove Godβs existence a priori, using reason alone and starting from the definition of God (e.g. Anselm defines God as "that than which nothing greater can be conceived"). Unlike cosmological or teleological arguments, the ontological argument does not rely on empirical observation but on conceptual analysis.
πβ What does the *evidential* problem of evil aim to show?
The evidential problem of evil is an inductive argument - it claims that the amount and distribution of evil make Godβs existence *unlikely* rather than *logically impossible*. In contrast, the logical problem of evil is a deductive argument, aiming to show that God and evil are logically incompatible, which is a much stronger claim.
π§ β Which of God's attributes means 'complete and perfect knowledge'?
God's omniscience means God is said to know everything - all facts, events, and even thoughts from past, present, and future, with no gaps in His knowledge.
πβ Which of Aquinas' 5 ways is a cosmological argument from *contingency* rather than causation?
Cosmological arguments from causation (e.g. Aquinas' 1st and 2nd ways) reason from the empirical principles of cause and effect (e.g. "every effect has a cause"). However, cosmological arguments from contingency (e.g. Aquinas' 3rd way and Leibniz's cosmological argument) reason from the principles of contingency and necessity. If something exists contingently, then it might not have existed, which raises the question of why it exists at all. Cosmological arguments from contingency say the only answer that explains contingently existing things is the existence of a necessarily existing being, God.
ποΈβ Which philosopher used the 'perfect island' thought experiment to challenge ontological arguments?
Anselm argued that God must exist because it's greater to exist in reality than only in the mind and God is "a being greater than which cannot be conceived". So, if God didn't exist, it would contradict this definition of God. But Gaunilo argued that this same reasoning could be applied to anything, e.g. the perfect island. But we don't take the perfect island to exist, so Anselm's reasoning must go wrong somewhere.
πΆβπ«οΈβ What does it mean for a statement to be 'eschatologically verifiable'?
John Hick argues that God's existence is eschatologically verifiable. This is because if God exists and is anything like the descriptions in the Bible, for example, then after we die and the current age has ended, people will be resurrected and meet God face-to-face on judgement day. Although not empirical verification in the sense of something we can verify in this life, such an experience of meeting God would constitute verification - eschatological verification - that God exists.
π§β In Humeβs Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, which character defends a version of the teleological argument for God's existence?
In Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, Hume considers a version of the teleological - AKA design - argument (through the character Cleanthes), which he later goes on to reject (through the character of Philo). Cleanthes says the universe is like a machine because it is orderly, complex, and made up of parts that have specific purposes. For example, the parts of the eye work together to produce sight, and Earthβs orbit around the sun creates stable conditions for life. In both cases, different parts are arranged to achieve certain goals. So, the universe is similar to a watch or a car. And since we know that watches and cars are designed by intelligent creators, Cleanthes argues that, by analogy, it makes sense to think the universe also has a designer.
πͺ¨β The paradox of the stone is a challenge to which of God's attributes?
God's omnipotence can be understood as the claim that God can do literally anything. But the paradox of the stone asks: Could God create a stone so heavy He couldn't lift it? If yes, there's something God can't do (He can't lift it). But if no, there's also something God can't do (He can't create it). This suggests an omnipotent being is paradoxical and impossible.
πΉβ Which of the following is an example of natural evil?
Natural evil refers to pain or suffering caused by natural processes such as earthquakes, diseases, floods, or droughts. These events are not the result of the free choices of moral agents, such as human beings. Moral evil, in contrast, refers to pain or suffering that results from agents exercising their free will (e.g. murder, lying, and stealing are moral evils because they result from human choices).
π₯β Which cosmological argument is an argument from *horizontal* or temporal causation?
Horizontal cosmological arguments (from causation, as opposed to contingency) trace a sequence of causes and effects *backwards in time* to God. This is in contrast to vertical cosmological arguments (from causation), such as Aquinas' 2nd way, that appeal to a hierarchy of causes *in the present moment* back to a sustaining cause (God).
π¨βπΌβ How does Basil Mitchell characterise religious belief?
Mitchell uses the parable of the partisan to show that religious belief involves trust and commitment, rather than being a 'provisional hypothesis' that is abandoned as soon as evidence counts against it. The believer recognises evidence both for and against their belief, but interprets this evidence in light of a prior commitment. However, this does not make the belief unfalsifiable or immune to evidence - i.e. it is not a 'vacuous formula' - because the religious believer acknowledges counter-evidence (such as the problem of evil) that counts against their belief in God.
πͺβ What is a theodicy?
The problem of evil raises the question of why an omnipotent (all-powerful) and omnibenevolent (all-loving) God would allow evil, given that such a being would both desire to, and be powerful enough, to eliminate all evil. Theodicies are explanations of why such a being would allow evil (e.g. because of free will or soul-making). More precisely, a theodicy tries to give the *actual* reason God allows evil, as opposed to a defence which only tries to give a *logically possible* reason why God allows evil.
πβ Which philosopher first argued that existence is not a predicate, rejecting ontological arguments for the existence God?
Immanuel Kantβs argument is that existence is not a predicate. Unlike e.g. 'red' or 'powerful', 'existence doesnβt add to the concept of something. For example, if you add 'red' to your idea of a dog, it changes that idea because 'red' is a real predicate. But if you add 'existence' to your idea of that dog, the idea doesn't change - it's still just an idea of a dog, it doesn't change the idea into something that exists in reality. So, similarly, adding 'existence' to the idea of God doesn't prove the idea exists *in reality*, it's still just *the idea* of something that exists. And so, you canβt prove God exists just by defining Him as existing.
β€οΈβ Which argument challenges the idea of an omnibenevolent (supremely good) God?
The Euthyphro dilemma asks: Are things good (1) because God *makes* them good, or (2) does God command us to do good things *because* they are good? In other words: Does God (1) *create* moral rules, or (2) just *follow* moral rules? If (2) and God follows moral rules, then morality is independent of God. But this undermines God's omnibenevolence because it suggests that the source of moral goodness is not God Himself but this external standard of goodness, the moral law. Further, this challenges Godβs omnipotence because it suggests Godβs power is limited by morality - that God is not powerful enough to make βmurder is goodβ true, for example. However, if (1) and God creates moral rules, then morality is whatever God says. But this undermines God's omnibenevolence too because it appears to make morality arbitrary - it suggests God plucked rules such as 'don't murder' and 'don't steal' out of thin air. Or, in other words, if God said "murder is good", it would be true and we would still be calling God perfectly good, which seems wrong.